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to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in
publications to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the
author to protect the tentative character of these papers.

In marked contrast to the first half of the twentieth century
when there is no evidence of sustained per capita growth in China,
since the Cormnunist Party rose to nower in 1949 per capita output has
Excluding the period of rapid recovery from

accelerated rapidly.

war and civil war setbacks ,which was largely complete by the end of
1952, per capita output (measured in constant prices) tripled between
1952 and the late 1970s.

Although aggregate output accelerated, agri

cultural performance was only marginally better than it had been in
1
the six centuries before the Communist Party came to power.

Farm out

put rose by less than one-half of one percent per year per capita up
to the late 1970s.

Industrial output, by contrast, grew in excess of

eleven percent annually, nine percent in per capita terms.

2

This paper

sketches out an explanation of the unusual disparity i~ the sectoral
rates of growth up to the late 1970s and ventures a preliminary judg
ment on whether the change in economic policy regime instituted since
1978 can be expected to alter the historic patterns of growth.

Agriculture in Historical Perspective
In his remarkable study, Agricultural Development in China 1368-1968, Dwight
Perkins explains how Chinese agriculture supported, at what appears to be
a constant level of per capita output, a population that grew from 65-80
million at the beginning of the Ming Dynasty in 1368 to 540 million by
the middle of the twentieth century.

His careful empirical research

suggests that only about half of that population increase was supported
by simply expanding' sown area within an otherwise unchanging agriculture.
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Although agriculture was still traditional by the usual criteria that
farmers' knowledge about factors they used had not changed in generations
and net'per capita savings was quite low,

3

Chinese agriculture had be-

come increasingly complex and sophisticated.
Increased sophistication of Chinese agriculture was evident pri
marily in the evolution of cropping and marketing patterns rather than
changes in mechanical technology.

4

The 100st well-known cropping

pattern changeswa-e stimulated by the introduction of early ripening
rice varieties from central Indo-China during the Sung Dynasty (9601126).5

Initially planted in limited areas in the southeast, within

two centuries these varieties were grown widely in Chekiang, southern
Kiangsu, and Kiangsi and by the Ming Dynasty they had diffused to
large parts of the southwest and to central China, especially the
present-day provinces of Hupeh and Hunan.

Diffusion of early ripening

varieties contributed to increased grain output for two reasons.

First,

their shorter growing season allowed the spread of multiple cropping
from south to central China.

Second, because their water require~nts

were less than those of the traditional rice varieties, early ripening
varieties allowed the spread of rice cultivation to higher lands where
water supplies were previously insufficient to support rice cultivation.
The introduction of new food crops such as corn, peanuts, Irish
potatoes as well as tobacco, cotton, and other non-food crops also
contributed to agricultural growth and changes in patterns of regional
settlement.
became

Peanuts, for example, could be grown in poorer quality soils so

particularly important crops in sandy areas of the lower Yellow

River and in poorer,JIIOuntainous districts.

In brief, the cultivation
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of new crops was not distributed randomly across the Chinese agrarian
landscaoe.

Rather innovative Chinese peasants tended to adoot the

cultivation of these crops in regions of comparative advantage.
That process of increasing specialization, which contributed
importantly to growing productivity per unit of land, was dependent on
increased marketing, not only locally but interregionally as well.
During the transitional period from mid-T'ang to Sung the subsistence
basis of the rural economy was replaced by. an increasingly complex
marketing system.
sites

Over an ever-broadening area

developed into marketing towns, linking

marketing

1 mar k ets. 6
.
.
. h interregiona
wit

some periodic market
intra-rural

The development of inter-

regional markets in rice and other staple commodities began as early
as the T'ang Dynasty (618-906) and accelerated in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries as increased cultivation of sugarcane and other
cash crops on the southeast coast was facilitated by rice and other
staoles shipped from surplus regions in the Yangtse Delta, the Canton
Delta, and the central Kan River Valley.

7

Even prior to the Ming it

appears that the great southward migration of population had led to
pooulation densities on the southeast coast far in excess of what could
have been supported on the basis of rice cultivation alone.

The

population density was sustained on the basis of cash crops that were
traded for rice from surplus grain regions.
Although the regions of surplus cereal production shifted over
time, interregional trade increa.sed.

By the first half of the 17th

century the lower Yangtse region itself had become a grain-deficit
region because of ~creased allocation of land to the production of
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noncereal crops and a rising rate of urbanization.

The lower Yangtse

had come to depend on rice supplied from Kiangsi, Anhui, and especially
present-day Hunan and Hupei where rice production had increased sub
stantially because of the introduction of early ripening varieties.
discussed above.

8

In the late seventeenth century Hunan and Hupeh had become the
bread basket of the Chinese empire.

Their rice surpluses flowed down

the Yangtse River to suoplv cereal-deficit regions in the lower Yangtse.
Part of that supply moved north to the Ch'ing capital at Peking via the
Grand Canal.

Hunan also shipped somewhat smaller quantities to the

southeast coastal provinces of Fukien and Kwangtun2 and to western
regions such as Shensi and possibly to Kweichow in the southwest.
and Kraus estimate that at

Chuan

mid-Ch'ing Hunan-Hupeh exports totalled

from 500,000 to 750,000 metric tons. 9
Another major example of interregional trade was the grain-cotton
trade between north and central China.

By the seventeenth and eighteenbh

centuries textile production in the lower Yangtse was dependent on- raw
rnrt-nn prorh1ren in ~h,mtnng,. Hon;in smd p1"~i:::~nf"-d,:iy Hopei= 10

These

regions in north China, in turn, depended for part ai their food con
sumption· on cereals originating in the middle Yangtse region that flowed
down river and then were shipped north via the Grand Canal or coastal
routes from the lower Yangtse.

Thus a triangular trade based on

relatively inexpensive water transport emerged, facilitating productivity
growth.

The expansion of specialized production based on comparative

advantage and interregional trade in agricultural products was stimulated
further by railroad'development after 1895, particularly in north and
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northeast China where water transport was limited.
Thus while production technology changed little between the four
teenth and early twentieth centuries> Chinese peasants responded
positively to new opportunities that arose from the availability of
improved seed varieties, new crops, improved transport systems, and
rising urban demand.

In most respects peasant behavior appears con

sistent with the view advanced by T.

w.

Schultz and others that

peasants respond efficiently to new production and marketing oppor
tunities.11

For reasons that are not well understood, however, the

increased physical productivity of Chinese farming and absorption of
new crops did not lead to a growth of incomes,
"on the contrary,
12
growth was all demographic."
Thus by the mid-twentieth century
arable land per agricultural worker was only six-tenths of a hectare,
substantiallv less than the levels in o.ther developing countries in
-

-

~d_

East Asia> Southeast Asia and South Asia,/of course, much less than
12a
at the onset of modern economic growth in Japan or Western Europe.

Development Policy Since 1949
While population growth increased and arable land actuallv shrank
after 1949, the thesis of this paper is that persistent undervaluation
of agriculture by the Chinese Communist Party contributed significantly
to the relatively slow growth of agriculture after 1949.

Undervaluation

of agriculture is reflected in policies that, on balance, have reduced
peasant income earning ooportunities~ inhibited efficient resource
allocation within agriculture , and depressed agricultural investment.
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Price and Marketing Arrangements
Und~rvaluation of agriculture initially was reflected in the system
of producer levies introduced in the fall of 1953.

Prior to that time

the state sought to satisfy the growing demands for agricultural raw
material by state manufacturing establishme~ts by purchasing commodities
on rural periodic markets.

State influence on the production decisions

of peasants was indirect and depended on peasant responsiveness to
changes in relative prices.

Meeting demands for agricultural raw

materials and increasingly for urban consumption, however, was increasingly
expensive since the terms of trade between the state and peasantry
were turning in favor of the peasantry.

Because of the increased

demand on state resources as the First Five Year Plan was getting under
way, a system of compulsory levies at fixed prices was introduced in
the fall of 1953.
In theory the average price received by peasants in a system
combining forced deliveries to the government at low prices and an un
restricted market for the remainder of peasant surpluses need not be
less than the price that would be received on a single free market
with no government intervention.

13

The average price received under

a system with quota deliveries is simply the weighted average of the
price received for sales to the state and the price on the open market for the
residual of peasant marketings.

In the short run, if the government

separates the urban market for grain into high and low income consumers
and supplies the grain purchased at below market prices to low income
urbanites, while the urban rich compete for the reduced supply on an

-7-

open market, the average price received by producers will be higher than
under a free market with no government intervention.

This result

depends"onlv o_n the (absolute) price elasticity of demand of the urban
14
This rationale has
rich being less than that of the urban poor.
been advanced in favor of the Indian system of producer levies.
attraction

Its

is the ability to use the price mechanism to transfer.income

from the urban rich to urban poor, and perhaps even to the peasantry,
without imposing a negative incentive effect on producers.
In practice, the conditions necessary for this happy outcome have
never been fulfilled in China.

15

Most critical, the Chinese coupon

rationing system for cereals and edible vegetable oils as early as
1955 was extended to encompass the entire urban population and the
amounts supplied were sufficiently generous that the volume of inter
sectoral sales by peasants at uncontrolled prices was reduced sub
stantially.

Moreover, prior to the imposition of the producer levy

svstem,the state converted traditional grain markets in cities and in
market towns to state grain markets, where prices were subject to
~r~rP rnntrol_

The only remaining outlet for cereals were smaller

informal markets within the countryside.

But even here sales were

limited in volume and private millers could no longer purchase grain
in these markets for ultimate resale to market town or city dwellers.
Private traders and processers came under the administrative jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Food and its local agencies.

All of these ·re

strictions were necessary to ensure that grain taxes, paid in kind,
and quota delivery targets were fulfilled.

Consequently. the magnitude

of grain transactiops in rural markets was curtailed substantially, from

-8-

about seven to eight million metric tons in the early 1950s to two to
Restricti ons on cotton which

three million metric tons by 1954-55.
was alse subject to delivery quotas

were more severe.

Private sale

of raw cotton was prohibite d and the sale of handicraf t yam spun or
cloth woven by cotton growers was also prohibite d.
In the decades following the impositio n of producer levies at fixed
prices

rural markets have been liberaliz ed in three periods; from the

middle of 1956 through the fall of 1957, from 1961 or 1962 through 1965,
and since 1979.

In the first two of these periods the emergence of

the opportun ity to sell products privately either undermine d or raised
the cost to the governme nt's system of producer levies and the scope
was
of the markets subseque ntly/curta iled. Thus for most of the years since 1953
governmen t procureme nt policy has tende~ to depress the average price received
by farmers below the price that would prevail in the absence of governmen t interven
tion, reducing proc;luctio n in,centive s.

Moreo"V"er, the curtailme nt of local market

ing not only reduced the prices peasants received, but reduced their opportun ities
to earn income from the sale of counnodit ies not subject to state producer levies.

Comparati ve Advantage , Interregi onal Trade, and Produc_d. vity Growth
While constrain ts

on

local

marketing imposed efficienc y

losses because of the inhibitio n of specializ ation within local market
ing regions, curtailme nt of interregi onal trade was far more serious
since it interrupt ed the patterns of regional specializ ation based on
comparati ve advantage that were such an important source of productio n
growth during the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties . The suppressi on of internot
regional trade was.lmuch in evidence prior to the Great Leap Forward.
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Indeed during the early 1950s and continuing through the

First Plan (1952-1957) state

policy'facilitated trade and specialization.

The interprovincial

flow of cereal crops recovered rapidly in the early 1950s, reaching a
peak of 7.85 million metric tons in 1953, about 5.5 percent of cereal
.
16
production.

Interprovincial flows were only slightly less than this

for the four-year

average 1953-56.

While a portion of these flows actually went to feed the two
largest cities, Peking and Shanghai, which had provincial level
administrative status, a significant share supported patterns of
comparative advantage cropping that had evolved over previous cen
turies.17

A detailed analysis of the regional distribution of cropping

of cotton, China's most important non-food crop, for example, shows
that its production was concentrated in traditional cotton-growing
regions of the Norbli China Plain.

Among all Chinese provinces Hopei

had·the strongest comparative advantage in cotton production (as
measured by the yield of cotton relative to cereal crops) and the
highest share of land sown to cotton (8.5 percent).

Moreover 80 per

cent of cotton production was concentrated in the southern and central
portions of the province.

In the eight major producing counties cotton

sown area on average absorbed a third of total sown area and in ohe
county, Ch'engan, reached a peak of 51 percent.

During those years

40 percent of the cotton produced in the region was shipped to other
provinces or to Shanghai, China's traditional textile center.

Because

of its concentration in comparative advantage crops such as cotton, and
to a lesser extent.peanuts and sesame, the province was the single largest
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importer of cereals during the First Plan. The state supplied on
average over a million tons of foodgralns per year, slightly over 10
percent,of provincial production.
Cotton was not unique; interregional trade facilitatEdspecialized
production of soybeans, other oilseed crops, sugarcane, sugar beet, etc.
Nor was specialization necessarily limited to the Yani;i;tse River region
regions
· water or
or cotton producing/on the North China Plain where/rail transport
facilitated low cost movement of bulky crops.
sometimes specialized in high value crops.

Even more remote regions

In mountainous southern

Yunnan Province, on the border with Laos and Burma, grain production
in the Hsishuangpana Thai Autonomous Chou historically was never
sufficient to meet consumption needs.

In the 1950s, prior to the

emergence of local self-sufficiency as a policy, this area continued
its historic specialization in production of high value noncereal
crops such as tea, shellac, tropical fruits, and medicinal herbs which
they traded for 70 percent of their food requirements.
mountainous northwest Hunan a single

In remote

prefecture prior to liberatjon

produced one-fifth of China's tung oil.

In the 1950s tung oil, tea

oil, timber, medicinal herbs, and forestry products were the basis of
the local economy and were traded for rice produced in the alluvial
regions of Hunan, especially around Tungt':ing Lake.
Although its origins are not well understood, local self-sufficiency
in cereals became an important policy objective during the Greap Leap
Forward.

The communes formed at that time were to become largely self

contained local communities each with their own small-scale industries,
food processing plants, and social service system.
,, ,

Provincial Party
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secretaries on the North China Plain, such as Wu Chih-p'u in Honan,
sought to demonstrate the success of the Great Leap locally by pro
claiming that they had become self-sufficient in cereals. 18

Policies

of self-sufficiency were abandoned in the first half of the 1960s as
economic policy formulation increasingly was influenced by Ch'en YUn,
the highest ranking Party economic specialist.

In the 1950s Ch'en had

promoted more favorable price and marketing policies, but he was
pushed aside by Mao Tsetung when the Great Leap Forward got underway. 19
However, interregional trade never recovered to the level of the
1950s and, after the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, trade
shrank further.

In 1965

interprovincial cereal exports were 4.7

million-metric tons or 2.8 percent of production.

That presumably

was up from a trough in 1960-61,but data for those years are not
available.

By 1978,after a decade of emphasis on cereal production

and self-sufficiency, interprovincial exports had shrunk to 2.05
million tons or less than one percent of output.

And of this flow 1.68

million tons was destined for international markets. 20

Thus internal

trade of domestically produced cereals had shrunk to a few hundred
thousand tons, less than one-tenth of one percent of domestic production.
In Hunan province, for example, with a population of about 50 million
where per capita grain production (80 percent rice) in 1978 was 84
kilograms or more than 25 percent in excess of the national average,
rice exports were only 500,000 tons, less than three percent of production,
and probably less, in absolute term~ than they were two and one-half centuries
earlier. Rice exports of other provinces, where the widespread adoption of high
yielding short-staik rice varieties had contributed to rapid growth of
21
output and high levels of per capita production were similarly low.
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Suppression of interregional marketing by the government appears
to have substantially reduced the efficiency of farm production.

The

reduction or loss of external sources of cereals led to less efficient
production in regions that historically tended to specialize in non
grain crops that they traded for cereals.

Traditional cereal producers,

in response to reduced supplies of nongrain crops from external sources,
sought to increase their own production of sugar and other crops,
although the opportunity cost in terms of lost cereal production was
considerable.

Increased inefficiency is reflected in western

estimatesof declining total factor productivity between 1965 and the
late 1970s and in a sharp rise in the cost of purchased inputs as a
share of the gross value of output. 22
Although one cannot separate out the effects of reduced inter
regional trade from egalitarian distribution policies within
individual producing units that may have diminished X-efficiency, the
significance of reduced interregional trade is suggested by examining
a few individual localities.
In northwest Hunan by 1979 there were 915 poverty stricken pro
duction teams, where per capita incomes were less than forty yuan per
capita annually, the monetary value of the nationally established
poverty line in rural areas. 23As external supplies of grain had been
curtailed the region had been forced to pursue cereal self-sufficiency,
largely through slash and burn methods that destroyed the traditional
basis of their livelihood, tung oil and other forestry products.
In the 1950s Fukien province on the southeast coast of China was
a major sugar producer
and exporter, continuing a pattern that had been
,, ,
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evident since the twelfth century.

24

Since sugar is a minor food item,

the share of land devoted to its cultivation was low for the province
as a whole (about one percent of sown area) but production was con
centrated in a few densely populated counties in Chinchiang Prefecture
where as much as twenty percent of the land was devoted to sugarcane
cultivation.

This region of Fukien continued to depend on external

grain supplies in the 1950s as it had for centuries.

Production fell

because of the crisis brought on by the Great Leap Forward, but had
fully recovered by 1965 in the wake of the more favorable price and
market policies adopted in the early 1960s.

Just before the onset of

the Cultural Revolut•ion Fukien shipped 100,000 tons of refined sugar,
over half of total production.
By 1976 sugar yields, production, and export had all fallen
sharply.

Exports, for example, fell to 22,000 tons, a fifth the level

of 1966.

Naturally as trade opportunities were reduced peasant income

and consumption fell sharply.
the most important sugarcane producer in Fukien,
averaged
1976 per capita cereal consumotion
In Hsienyu County/by
,
only 145 kilograms (unprocessed) per capita, well below the 200 kilogram
level that constitutes the official poverty standard in south China.
The depression of farm income and consumption through the curtailment
of long-established trade patterns is not surprising.

The dense

population on the southeast coast could only be sustained on the basis
of specialized production of high value crops such as sugarcane arid
fruits.

i.

Arable land in Hsienyu in the late 1970s was extremely limited,

.03 hectares per capita, about two-thirds less than the national average.
Although

rice yields in the region were among the highest in all of

25
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China, trade curtailment reduced the region to abject poverty.
The high cost of trade restriction is confirmed by developments
in more recent years.

Only four years after the central government

guaranteed the availability of cereals for sale to cane producers, cane
sown area increased two-thirds, yields more than doubled, refined
sugar output more than tripled, and shipments of refined sugar out
of the province rose over seven-fold.
producing regions roughly doubled.

Income of peasants in sugarcane
Moreover

this transformation was achieved solely through restoration of market
ing opportunities. 1n peasant transactions with the state there was
no change in the ratio of the price producers

paid for grain and the

price they received for sugarcane.

State Investment and Credit Policy
Undervaluation of agriculture by the state is also reflected in
26
.
state investment and credit policy. For the years 1953 through 1978
the state allocated 12 percent of state investment to agriculture,
60 percent to industry.

Since agriculture in 1952 was the sector of

-

origin of over three times as large as share of the economy as was
industry, the disproportion is even larger if the investment magnitudes
are expressed in terms of rates of reinvestment within each sector.
Naturally a complete analysis of the sectoral allocation of investment
requires an analysis of the flows of credit from the state banking
system and the internal reinvestment of collective farm units and of
state industrial enterprises.
analysis are as follows.

The main points that emerge from that

First, on balance the Chinese have pursued a
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classic Stalinist industrialization strategy.

Credit supplied by the

state banking system to collective agriculture has been quite modest.
Moreover, internal reinvestment in agriculture by collective units
in the aggregate has been quite small, averaging for example six to
seven percent of value added in agriculture in 1977 and 1978.

On

the

other hand internal reinvestment of retained earnings by enterprises
are quite large,especially after 1966.

But for complex bureaucratic

reasons these data are not reflected in state investment allocation
data.

Thus the 1: 5 ratio of investment shares may understate the

real tilt toward industry.

However, policy has not been uniformly

imbalanced in favor of industrial growth.

Up to 1957 and again since

1978 state credit flows to agriculture have been significant.

Internal

reinvestment by farmers up through 1957 also was somewhat greater, about
10 percent of value added in agriculture.

At least in part higher

rates of reinvestmnet in bhis period were possible because farmers
were not yet encumbered with a flow of high-priced agricultural pro
ducer goods such as chemical fertilizers and machinery.

After 1966

intern:::il reinvestment w:::is held do'!JTI heC'.:::111se declining prnd11C'.t-ivity

growth and the growing burden of overpriced modern inputs reduced the
growth of net revenues of collective units.

Simultaneously state

credit and investment flows were reduced, the former in absolute and
the latter in proportionate terms.
The niggardly flow of resources to agriculture from tihe state and
the high degree of taxation embedded in the price structure governing
peasant-state transactions is reflected in the very modest stock of
assets in collective agriculture.

Fixed assets (excluding land) per
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agricultural laborer in 1977-78 averaged only 275 yuan, less than a
tenth the level in industry.

The model communes

visitors are taken invariably

have innumberable tractors, pumps, and

to which western

a vast array of other types of farm machinery and equipment.
total fixed assets of the average team" which

But the

in 1977-78 had 60 workers

and 20 hectares of cultivated land, were less than 17,000 yuan.

At

the farm level prices prevailing in the late 1970s total physical produc
tive farming assets per team would be a single large tractor or three
walking tractors.

Summary
The inability of agriculture after 1949 to improve upon its his
toric pattern of simply matching the rate of growth of population seems
paradoxical.

During the first three decades of Communist rule there

were important improvements in irrigation systems, the early development
and wide diffusion of high yielding rice varieties, the developme~t
of a large modern chemical fertilizer industry, and major improvements
in transportation systems:, particularly roads and railroads.

The

pace of these developments should have been conducive to
agricultural output growth in excess of demographic growth but that
did not, in fact, occur.
Instead what emerged was a classic pattern of imbalanced growth,
whether measured in output trends, discussed at the outset of this paper
or in terms of investment shares, discussed in the last section.

Not

only did industrial growth accelerate while agriculture stagnated:, most
industrial growth was concentrated in heavy industry.

Coal" steel, and
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electric power output soared while per capita cotton cloth consumption
by 1978 was significantly lower than two decades earlier.

In short,

Chinese agriculture proved far too complex to thrive in an economic
system in which the state systematically interferred with local markets,
reduced interregional flows of agricultural connnodities, and suppressed
farm prices.

Development Policy Since the End of the Cultural Revolution
In many respects 1977-1978 appears to mark a major watershed in
Chinese agricultural development policy.
growth in the past now have been modified.

All of the factors retarding
State purchase prices for

farm products on average rose more than 40 percent between 1977 and 1981
and the state bank substantially increased the flow of credit to agri
culture.

Rural markets were reopened widely by 1979 and sale of grain

and edible vegetable oils by producers is legal, after government
delivery quotas are filled.

The state also has sought to guarantee

the sale of adequate supplies of cereals to producers of cotton, sugar
cane, and some other economic crops, when necessary through interregional
grain transfers.
These policy changes have led to a remarkable acceleration of
agricultural growth.

Between 1977 and 1981 cotton output rose 45

percent; sugarcane, 70 percent; sugar beet, 160 percent; oil seed crops,
155 percent; meat, 62 percent.
of noncereal

27 Wh·l
1

h. growt h o f output
e part o f tis

crops reflects increased allocation of sown area to

noncereal crops following a relaxation of the emphasis on cereal
production and an increase in hhe relative price of noncereal as
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compared with cereal crops, much of the growth is accounted for by
increased yields.

Cereal sown area:has fallen by more than six million

hectares, not only because of increased area sown to economic crops
but an even larger reduction in the multiple grain cropping that had
been undertaken in the first half of the·1970s when pressure was brought
to bear to increase grain output without adequate consideration for costs.
Despite these losses in grain sown area,output rose 15 percent between
1977 and 1981, since yields rose more than 20 percent.
A

large portion of the growth of yields and output can be explained

by the reemergence of more rational cropping patterns.

State guarantees

of adequate cereal supplies to sugar producers, undertaken as early as
1977 in Fukien, were extended to

the other major producing regions,

Kwangtung and Kwangsi in 1980 and 1981, respectively.

The increase in

yields, output, and shipments of refined sugar outcf comparative
advantage regions has so reduced production

of cane in noncomparative

advantage regions that even as output has risen 70 percent, total national sown
area has shrunk by almost 15 percent.
Reemergence of specialized cotton production in northwest Shantung
is another success story.

28

In the 1950s four prefectures in the north-

west portion of the province continued their historic specialization in
cotton production.

In 1956 and 1957 their sown area was 590,000 and

530,000 hectares, 80 percent of the provincial total.

At the trough of

production in the 1970s,in response to the attempt to become self
sufficient in grain, cotton sown area dropped to as low as 250,000
hectares and most of the counties in the area fell into poverty.

In

1977-79 the greatest concentration of rural poverty in terms of both

-19-

numbers of counties and of people was in the North China Plain and a
large number of these were in areas of historic cotton specialization.
Almost all of the chronic poverty in Shantung was in the cotton
growing regions of the northwest.
The success of the reemergence of specialization is reflected
in a quadrupling of provincial cotton output between 1978 and 1981 and
the reemergence of Shantung as a major cotton exporter.

By 1981 exports

were almost 60 percent of output--ahead of the 40 percent share shipped
out during the 1950s.

29

More significantly by 1980 sown area in the

nowthwest part of the province had recovered to the level of the 1950s
and twenty of the twenty-two counties, with a total population in
excess of twenty million, had escaped the poverty level with incomes
rising from one-third below the national average in 1978 to 10 percent
above the national average in 1980.
Much of the growth in yields and output since 1978 can be accounted
for by the reemergence of specialized production, as in central coastal
Fukien and northwest Shantung, the renewal of marketing opportunities,
and the sale of adequate supplies of food crops to peasants producing
economic crops.
Although the new policies seem initially successful in terms of
their positive stimulus to output, efficiency,and farm income,it is not
clear that they will be sustained.

Already there is evidence that the

Party is retreating from the policies embraced so eagerly in 1978
and especially 1979.

Promised reductions in the prices of major

agricultural producer goods have not been forthcoming; promised
,

increases in state funds for agricultural investment have fallen victim
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to the general budgetary retrenchment of the past few years; rural
markets, that have contributed so much to the revival of the farm economy,
have come under increased state regulation and price controls; even
the higher prices the state has paid since 1979 for farm products,are
under pressure.

Perhaps most surprising, in the spring of 1982 the

government froze the existing levels of interprovincial cereal transfers
for a three-year period.

30

The root cause of all of these signs of retreat is the Party's
continued commitment to insulate urban consumers from higher farm level prices
and an unwillingness to reduce further the rate of investment.

The policy of

providing staple foods at fixed prices to the urban population is not new.

It began in 1952 but since the mark-up between state purchase prices
for unprocessed grain in the countryside and the resale of wheat flour
and polished rice at ration prices in cities was between
100 and 150 percent, these transactions were highly
profitable.

31

Even after absorbing processing losses, transport costs,

and marketing costs, profits, which were channeled to the state
form

yuan per year.

were about one h~lf hillinn

By the mid-1970s, however, losses had become significant

since farm-level prices had been raised considerably in the first half
of the 1960s and retail price adjustments were quite modest--three to
seven perceat for major cereals.

Between 1974 and 1978 losses on the

purchase and resale of cereals and vegetable oils cumulated to 20.8
billion yuan.
Losses
fixed

mounted rapidly after 1978 because retail prices remained

while prdcurement prices rose sharply.

Losses on cereals
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and edible vegetable oils are now .2 yuan and .8 yuan per kilogram
meaning that the ration price of cereal covers only 60 percent of the
cost of procurement and marketing and an even lower share of the costs
of edible vegetable oils. 32

By 1981 total subsidies, almost all of

which accrued to the urban population and the small number of state
employees in rural areas,were about 25 billion yuan.

That is the

equivalent of fully one-quarter of state budgetary revenues (combining
all levels of government), more than six percent of national income
(based on the Chinese national income concept), or 30 percent of the
wage bill of state workers and employees.
These subsidies dwarf those for the Food

Corporation of India which

manages India's Fair Price Shap System with losses well under one percent
of national income.

More significant, Chinese subsidies far surpass

those prevailing in other centrally planned systems.

In the most

notorious case, Poland, food subsidies soared in the 1970s and by 1980
were 18 percent of the wage fund, only about two-thirds the Chinese
level.
The financial burden of £bod subsidies on the state by 1981 had
grown so large that it became clear that the state could no longer
simultaneously maintain an investment rate of thirty percent or more;
provide basic food commodities to urban consumers that in nominal terms
were only about five percent above the levels of 1952 and in real terms
had fallen for three decades, and sustain the higher prices offered
to peasants.
Most of the measures taken since 1980 suggest that the adjustment
to this financial burden is being borne by the peasantry.

Ch'mYun,
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the chief architect of the reforms institute d.

since

the end of the

Cultural Revolutio n and an ardent supporter of a:>re favorable price
and marketing incentive s for peasants, has ruled out upward adjustmen t
of urban retail prices for staple foods, recognizi ng that this could cause urban
chaos.
1978

33

to

Although state investmen t has declined from its peak of 37 percent in
28 percent in 1981, it appears to have remained stable

since then.

Moreover, the newly announced plan to quadruple

agricultu ral and industria l output by the year 2000 has created a new
impetus for high investmen t rates.

On the other hand, no less an

authority than Hu Yaobang, the Chairman of the Party, has stated that
future growth of farm income must be derived from increased output
34 Since 1981 in
and productiv ity growth, rather than higher prices.
particula r the state has made a concentra ted effort to reduce average
farm prices, not by reducing posted prices but by reducing the share
of output purchased at higher above-quo ta and negotiate d prices,
that have been of increased importanc e since 1979.

Ironicall y the

state's curtailme nt of some rural marketing opportun ities, primar:Lly
to reduce the main competito r to deliverie s to the state, and its
curtailme nt

of long.dist ance trade in cereal cropi... substant ially

reduces the prospects for peasants achieving income gains through
productiv ity growth.
, One is left with the impressio n that the modificat ion since 1978
of the historic emphasis on urban and industria l developme nt has
been modest.

Preservat ion of retail price stability for staple foods

consumed by the urban populatio n has been revealed as more important
than providing incentive prices to producers .

In some societies such
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a choice might be justified on equity grounds since the absolute level
of in~ome of the urban poor is low and they frequently suffer sharp
declines in their real income and consumption when food prices rose.
Such an argument does not appear persuasive in China.

As already

pointed out, rationing of subsidized foods is not targeted on the
urban poor but is universal for nonagricultural households.

Second,

according to official data the urban poor are extremely small in
number, a bout

2

.
35
percent of t h e urban popu 1ation.

Th at i s

hardly surprising since for two or more decades rural-urban migration
has been strictly controlled by t1ie·Ministry of Public Security and
secure urban employment has been the IIDSt important prerequisite
for approval to change place of residence.

Third, not only is rural

poverty more pervasive than urban poverty, the living standards of
the rural poor are probably lower than their urban counterparts.

Thus

it is likely that China's system of producer levies and urban rationing
worsens rather than improves the distribution of income.

Production

incentives and equity would be jointly improved by imposing fewer
constraints on farm level prices and providing subsidized food only
to the small share of the urban population that falls below the existing
urban poverty standard.

L

NOTES
l~Jght
_H. Perkins, Agricultural Development in China 1368-1968
uw~
(Chicago, Illinois:

Aldine Publlshing Company, 1968) estimates that

per capita output in agriculture ves unchanged between the beginning
of the Ming Dynasty in 1368 and the middle of the twentieth century.
2

Between 1952 and 1978 value added in agriculture rose 2.3 percent

per year, in industry, 11.3 percent.

Yang Jianbai and Li Xuezeng,

"The Relations between Agriculture, Light Industry and Heavy Industry
in China."

Social Sciences in China, No. 2, 1980, p. 183.

Thia

measure of agriculture growth is somewhat lower than that usually cited
since it is based on a net value measure and thus takes into account
the trend of rising production costs between 1952 and 1978.

The

sources of increased costs and declining efficiency of p_roduction
are explained below.
3

T.W. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture (New Haven, CT:

Yale University Press, 1964).
4

The best single study of these changes is the classic by

Studies in the Population of Chi11a·, 1368-1953

Ho

Ping-ti,

(Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Harvard University Press, 1959).
5

Ho Ping-ti, Studies in the Population of China and "Early Ripening

Rice in Chinese History", Economic History Review, vol. 9, No. 2 (1956),
pp. 200-218.
6toshinobu Shiba, "Urbanization and the Development of Markets
in the Lower Yangtze'Valley ", pp. 13-48 in Crisis and Prosperity in
Sung China, edited by Jolm Winthrop Haeger (Tucson, Arizona:
of Arizona Press, 1975).

University

-27Mark Elvin 1 The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford.
California:

Rawski, Agricultura l Change and the Peasant Economy of

s.

Evelyn

Stanford University Press, 1973), pp. 129, 166-72.

South China (Cambridge, Mass.1
8

0wight H. Perk.ins• _!tgricultura l Development in China 1368-1968_,
Gilbert Rozman• Urban Networks in Ch' in_g China and Tokugawa

p. 144.

(Princeton, New Jersey:

Japan
p. 130.
An

Hanard University Presa, 1972).

Chuan

Princeton University Press, 1973),

Han-sheng and Richard Kraus, Mid-Ch'ing Rice Markets:

Essay in Price History (Cambridge, Massachuse tts:

Harvard

Asian Research Center, 1975), 59.
9

Chuan and Kraus, Mid-Ch'ing Rice Markets, pp. 70-71

·
10
Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, p. 213.

Ho Ping-ti,

Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953, p. 201-2.
.
11
T.W. Schultz, Transformin g Traditional Agriculture . Samuel
Popkin, The Rational Peasant:

The Political Economy of Rural Society

in Vietnam (Berkeley, California:
12

I

University of California Preas, 1979).

Eric Jones, The European Miracle: Environmen ts, Economies 9 and Geopolitics

in the History of Europe and Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 2]
12a

For a sample of Asian developing countries in 1955 the arable

land per worker ranged fran a high of 1.8 hectares in Pakistan, 1.2
hectares in India, etc.

Only in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan), with .54 hectares

per worker, was the man:land ratio less favorable than in China.

Yujiro

Hayami and Masao Kikuchi• _Asian Village Economy at the Crossroads (Tokyo and
Baltimore:

The University of Tokyo Press and the Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1981), p. 40.

Data for China are in Nicholas R. Lardy, Agriculture

in China's Economic Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming ),
Table 1-3.

13
Yujiro Hayami, K. Subbarao, and Keijiro Otsuka, "Efficien cy

and Equi~y in the Producer Levy of India"• American Journal of Agricultu ral
Economics, vol. 64, no. 4, (November 1982), pp. 655-663.

14

In the longer-ru n the stability of the system and the persiaten ce

of a weighted price above a single free market price also requires that
of
the (absolute ) elasticity /demand of the rich exceed the elasticit y of
supply of producers .
15

For document ation of the developm ents su1Jl'llarized below aee Lardy•

Agricultu re China's Economic Development, chapter 2.
16

Lardy, Agricultu re in China's Economic Development• Table 2-2.

17

Lardy, Agricultu re ·in China's Economic Development• chapters

two and four include

discussio n of the evolution

a detailed

of cropping patterns and interregi onal trade and complete citations to the
relevant primary source materials .
18

\..'u's claims and Ch'en 's response are analyzed in Lardy,

Agricultu re in China's Economic Growth, chapter 4.

19 This period is analyzed in Nicholas R. Lardy and Kenneth
Lieberth al, Chen Yun's Strategy for China's Development:
Alternati ve (Armonk,
20

New York:

A Non-Maoist

M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1982).

Interregi onal community flow data from Lardy, chapter 2. Chineae

cereal export data from Annual Economic Report of China 1 1982 (Hong Kong;
Hong Kong Modern Culture Company, 1982), p. VIII-47.
2 ~rovinci al cereal output data from provincia l newspape rs and
broadcas ts.

-4-

Rice export data from Kwangtung Economics Society, An Economic lnvestigati~
of Kwangtung (Kwangchou, KwangtWlg People's Publishing House• 1981) •
p. 195.

Other rice exporters (i.e. shipments out of province) were

Kwangsi, 25,000 tons; Hupei, 300,000 tons; Kiangsu,350,000 tons;
Chekiang, 100,000 tons.

Per capita output in these four provinces

ranged from 408 to 340 kilograms, compared to the national average of
318.·

Exports as a share of grain production ranged from two-tenths of one percent

in Kwangsi to 1.7 percent in Hupei.
22

See Anthony Tang• "Food and Agriculture in China:

Trends and

Projections, 1952-1977 and 2000," in Food Production in the People's
Republic of China by Anthony Tang and Bruce Stone (Washington, D.C.t
International F9od Policy Research Institute, 1980), p. 28 and Lardy
Agriculture in China's Economic Development, Table 2-8.

The latter

shows costs risi·1g from 27. 3 percent in 1965 to a peak of 35. 7 percent in 1977.

23Wu Yun-c'h'ang, "Speed
up Agricultural Development in the
Hsianghsi Minority Autonomous Region", People's Daily, September
15, 1980, p.4.
24

This summary analysis of sugar production is drawn from Lardy

Agriculture in China's Economic Development, chapter 2.
25

Hsiao Hui-c!lia and Chang Jui-san, "Link up Sugar and Grain,

Develop Comparative Advantage'' People's Daily August 18, 1980, p. 2 gives
HsienyuCounty population and cultivated area data as 720,000 and
24,000 hectares, respectively.

For the national data see Lardy, Agriculture

in China's Economic Development, chapter 1.

-.,-

26

Investment and credit policy and discussed more fully and data

sources provided in Lardy• Agriculture in China' a Economic Developmen t,
Chapter 3.27

State Statistical Bureau,

Statistical Publishing House, 1982) p.

(Peking:
28

Chinese Statistical Yearbook

,
This summarizes discussion.

in Lardy, Agriculture in

China's Economic Development, chapters 2 and 4.
29

Pai Ju-ping "Adjust the Structure of Agriculture , Raise

Economic Efficiency" , Red Flag, No. 1. 1982, pp. 15-19.

30
Ministry of Food, Rural Procurement and Sales Office,
"Purchased Grain May Not be Used to Fulfill Procurement Tasks".
Agricultura l Work Bulletin, No. 3, 1982, p. 45.

31 This analysis of prices and consumption subsidies draws on
Nicholas R. Lardy, "China:

Agricultura l Pricing Policy"• unpublished

study prepared for the World Bank, November 1982.
,..

32

Loss data per unit of ration sales is provided in Ministry of

Food Research Office, A Discussion of Policy on Procurement and Sales
of Cereals and Oils in Rural Areas (Peking:

Finance and EconOlllics

Publishing House, 1981),p. 4.

33Quoted in Teng Li-ch'un, Study Bow to do Economic Work From
Ch'en

Y:k

(Peking:

Chinese C0111DUnist Party Central" Party School Publishing

House, 1981).

34

Hu

Yuobang, "Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist

Modernizati on," Beijing Review, September 13, 1982, p. 18.

35

The urban poverty standard is generally 20 yuan per iamily member

per month or 240 yuan per year.

In 1981 a survey of 8700 urban

households showed only 2.1 percent of the families fell below this
level.

Li Ch'eng-jui

and Chang Chung-li, "Remarkable Improvement in

Living Standards", Beijing Review, April 26, 1982, pp. 15-18,
This article is a sunmary of a longer text with more details
in Red Flag, no. 8, 1982, pp. 25-28.

18.

